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Democratization

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:
http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713634863

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Online Publication Date: 01 June 2006
To cite this Article: Hinnebusch, Raymond (2006) 'Authoritarian persistence, democratization theory and the Middle East: An overview and critique', Democratization, 13:3, 373 - 395
To link to this article: DOI: 10.1080/13510340600579243
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510340600579243

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Authoritarian Persistence, Democratization Theory and the Middle East: An Overview and Critique

RAYMOND HINNEBUSCH

What explains the democratic deficit and authoritarian persistence in the Middle East? An overview and critique of the cumulative layers of theoretical tradition that seeks to explain democratic and non-democratic outcomes provides a wealth of tools for understanding the Middle East case. Early modernization theory's analysis of 'requisites' proved indeterminate and cultural exceptionalist arguments identified merely an intervening variable. Later theories of developmental imbalances and nation-building dilemmas explained more convincingly why democracy failed in the Middle East. Historical sociology, in identifying the social structural bases of alternative regime paths, showed what put Middle East states on their own distinctive authoritarian pathways. Institutionalist approaches to state-building helped explain the consolidation of authoritarian regimes in the region while political-economy analysis showed how these regimes adapted to changes in their environment. Rational choice approaches help show why the agency to lead democratic transitions has been lacking. Analyses of the impact of globalization and of the United States hegemon suggest the international variable is compatible with liberalization of authoritarian regimes but not with democratization.

Key words: authoritarian; democratization; Middle East

The Debate on Democratization Studies

After a decade in which democratization studies were on the cutting edge, the wheel has turned again with growing claims that the 'third wave' is exhausted,[1] the transition paradigm misguided[2] and the democratization bandwagon bogged down in the quicksands of so-called hybrid or semi- or pseudo-democratic regimes.[3] Nowhere would the relevance of democratization theory seem more questionable than in the Middle East. Some have always regarded the region as exceptionally culturally resistant to democratization[4] and the Middle East's early liberal regimes quickly gave way to seemingly durable authoritarianism after independence. Yet, many scholars identified a growing demand for democratization and some movement towards it in the 1990s.[5] Since then, however, the reversal of (timid) democratization experiments, although not for cultural reasons, has been documented by Kienle, and by Ehteshami and Murphy.[6] Maye Kassem and William Zartman have shown how, paradoxically, party pluralization can reinforce authoritarian rulers.[7] Pool warned early on that enforcement of economic liberalization and austerity might require authoritarian

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Democratization, Vol.13, No.3, June 2006, pp.373–395
ISSN 1351-0347 print/1743-890X online
DOI: 10.1080/13510340600579243 © 2006 Taylor & Francis

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power.[8] I argued some years ago that authoritarian regimes can adapt to new conditions and specifically that their political liberalization or pluralization is, for structural reasons, more likely to be a substitute for democratization than a stage on the way to it.[9] Except in government circles in Washington, few now believe that if only authoritarian rulers are removed democratization is a natural outcome; indeed, an alternative might well be failed (or destroyed) states such as civil war Lebanon, Somalia and occupied Iraq, giving credence to the old Hobbesian[10] (and medieval Islamic) 'heresy' that the alternative to tyranny is even worse, namely, anarchy.

The reality of democratization is, indeed, much more complicated than official Western discourse imagines, as even a preliminary dissection of the very concept reveals. Democratization, Sorensen argues, must be seen as having two distinguishable and separable dimensions: first, increasing competitiveness, that is, political liberalization or pluralization, and secondly, increasing political equality, that is, inclusiveness. Full democratization would entail both competitiveness and inclusion. However, it is quite possible to increase the scope of competition for some parts of the population without increasing inclusiveness (in which case political liberalization signifies a move from autocracy to oligarchy or to limited class 'democracy'). Alternatively, inclusiveness *can* be increased without competitiveness: mass-mobilizing anti-oligarchic revolutions, normally institutionalized under single party regimes, do exactly that although, without competition, the public tends to be demobilized in the post-revolutionary period.[11] Finally, increased competitiveness can be associated with a shrinking of inclusiveness and there is evidence for this in the Middle East's liberalizing post-revolutionary regimes.

This analysis will explore the debate over the persistence of authoritarianism and the prospects for democratization in the Middle East by reviewing and critiquing the various theoretical approaches which, although often seeking to explain the conditions that obstruct or facilitate democratization, also provide insight into authoritarian survival. The discussion begins with the earliest debates and brings this forward to the current period. Each theoretical tradition adds a layer of analysis more or less useful for understanding the Middle East case.

Contending Explanatory Approaches

Modernization Theory (MT) and the Requisites of Democratization

Current democratization theory owes much to the early Modernization Theory (of the 1950s and 1960s) that examined the requisites of democratization in developing countries. It argued, based on the experience of the developed states, that beyond certain thresholds of economic development, societies become too complex and socially mobilized to be governed by authoritarian means.[12] What MT demonstrated convincingly was that high-income countries were most likely to be democratic and that rising literacy, urbanization and non-agricultural employment (indicators of 'social mobilization') were associated with an increased propensity to political participation (greater desire for it and efficacy to seek it). Conversely, democracy would be unviable in, and authoritarianism possibly congruent with, the features of many pre-modern societies.

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Modernization theory had, however, a problem in identifying the thresholds of modernization required for democracy and beyond which authoritarianism ceases to be viable. While the classic case of India suggests that democratic regimes are possible at relatively low levels of modernization, the robustness of European fascist and communist regimes suggests that authoritarianism can remain viable at quite high levels of income and social mobilization. Modernization levels are evidently not determinate and merely constitute an environment that may be more or less facilitative of certain kinds of regime, deterring democracy only at the very lowest levels and authoritarianism only at the very highest levels. Hence, MT can merely suggest that at the middle-income levels typical of the contemporary Middle East, democratization is possible but by no means necessary; it also tells us little about what conditions enable authoritarianism to remain viable at such levels.[13]

Given this indeterminacy, the Middle East experience can, however, be construed to be broadly compatible with the argument that modernization matters. Nineteenth-century modernization in the Ottoman Empire generated new landlord and middle classes whose participatory demands issued in some pluralization at the elite level (constitution, parliament).[14] Subsequently, the failure of most early (post-independence) semi-liberal (but largely oligarchic) regimes to survive through the early 1960s, much less to evolve into democracies, could well be attributed partly to still insufficient levels of modernization (high mass illiteracy, low income agricultural economies), hence of political consciousness. On the other hand, the failure of contemporary high-income Middle East oil states to democratize can also be understood in MT terms: modernization thresholds have not been exceeded in so far as much of this income derives from external rent that increases (and decreases) without much of the societal mobilization or complexity which MT believes make authoritarian governance unviable.

Nevertheless, because democratization did not happen in the Middle East at the income levels that produced some democratization elsewhere, some analysts have fallen back on the argument that the region's cultural exceptionalism has short-circuited the 'natural' linear relation between increased development and increased democratization. Islam, 'Oriental despotism', patrimonialism, patriarchalism, 'small group politics' and mass passivity were all said to make the region democracy-unfriendly.[15] Where such arguments see political cultures as essentially fixed and uniform, they are fundamentally misleading. Kedourie's view that 'Democracy is alien to the mind-set of Islam'[16] remains irredeemably essentialist at a time when most analysts insist that Islam varies too widely by context and time to constitute an unchanging religious obstacle to democratization any more than Catholicism was once wrongly said to be. Where other conditions are right (such as level of income and the presence of a private bourgeoisie, as in Turkey and Malaysia), Islam is no deterrent to democratization. Survey research shows that strong Islamic attachments do not discourage support for democracy.[17] Islamic movements have participated in elections in many countries, tend to be moderated by playing the electoral game, and are likely to become an obstacle to democratization only when radicalized by exclusion.[18] Similarly, clientelism and patriarchalism, having been quite compatible with pluralistic and democratic regimes in Mediterranean Europe,

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should pose no insurmountable obstacle to democratization in the Middle East. Nor does Middle East culture make people passive, for wherever they are given the opportunity to participate they grasp it with alacrity. The association of higher levels of modernization indicators such as literacy and modern employment with higher political consciousness holds no less in the Middle East than elsewhere and modern Islamism makes a positive religious duty of civic participation (*jihad*, or to struggle for good and against evil).

Arguably, culture has two impacts. First, it is important in shaping conceptions of political legitimacy, which are everywhere 'constructed' of inter-subjective (that is, cultural) understandings. It is plausible to argue that Islamic traditions accept authoritarian leadership as long as it is seen to serve the collective interest, that is, defends the community from outside threats and delivers welfare to which people feel entitled, and as long as it is seen to consult with the community (*shura*). This essentially collectivist/populist idea of leadership legitimacy is likely to be tolerant of populist versions of authoritarian rule. Dominant versions of Islam may also be associated with a more restricted (some might say more balanced) notion of individual, property and minority rights that is difficult to reconcile with contemporary liberal versions of capitalist democracy. However, on the other hand, Islam is less-obscurantist and more 'protestant' (having no priesthood with sacred powers) and more law-orientated than many religions; it is also more egalitarian than hierarchic cultural traditions such as Confucianism and Hinduism that have proved compatible with democratization. Modern Islamic notions of leadership do also incorporate accountability, and nowadays when authoritarian leadership fails to live up to Islamic standards it suffers de-legitimation widely, with Muslims forming or joining opposition movements. Moreover, conceptions of legitimacy are hardly fixed and Middle East versions have not been immune to an embrace (by Islamists as well as secularists) of the belief that the procedural practices of electoral democracy might be the best way to ensure against leadership deviation from the legitimate model. As Volpi argues, it is less a rejection of democracy, per se, than rival understandings of it that obstructs democratization.[19]

A second impact of culture derives from the pervasiveness of 'traditional' 'small group' loyalties, in good part an inheritance of the tribalism of nomadic societies in arid regions. On one hand, these make it harder (but not impossible) to construct broad-based civil society or strong political parties; for example, the impotence of opposition parties across the region can be attributed partially to such factors. On the other hand, *assabiya* (exclusionary group solidarity) was manipulated widely by authoritarian state builders to construct solidary elite cores for their states. A kinship culture is especially compatible with the use of clientalism by authoritarian elites as a form of political linkage with the masses. Moreover, the socialization transmitted within the patriarchal family is arguably congruent with patrimonial rule at the state level: just as the father expects, and receives, obedience in the family so the same may apply to the ruler in the state. Traditional culture did not *preclude* democracy but it was a ready-made resource that patrimonial state-builders could exploit.

In summary, Middle Eastern culture(s) is probably regarded most usefully not as an independent variable which obstructs democratization but as a intervening

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variable, in which conceptions of legitimacy which are more tolerant of authoritarian leadership under certain conditions, and surviving 'traditional' forms of association reinforce and prolong the viability of authoritarian regimes established for quite other reasons than culture. On the other hand, modernization is changing culture by increasing aspirations for participation and by endowing individuals with such necessary participatory tools as literacy. Whether such aspirations will be satisfied depends on other variables that are considered neither in mainstream MT nor by cultural approaches.

Later Modernization Theory: Imbalances and Nation-Building Dilemmas in 'Transitional' Societies

The failure of early MT's expectations for democratization in the less developed countries (LDCs) led to a revision of the theory, which was based more on empirical studies of LDCs and less on deductions from the experiences of the developed states. The new approaches located the obstacles to third world democratization in the imbalances typical of the 'transition' to modernity and the unresolved problems of nation-building.

One approach, epitomized by Huntington's *Political Order in Changing Societies* (1965) and by Karl Deutsch's work on social mobilization demonstrated that social mobilization in LDCs might lead not to democratization, but to what Huntington called 'praetorianism'. This was because mobilization typically exceeded the slower rate of economic development and political institution-building needed to satisfy and accommodate it.[20] What exacerbated the situation, as more Marxist-orientated analysts stressed, was that capital accumulation in modernizing countries required high profits for investors while squeezing workers and peasants. The result was, as the well-known 'Kuznets curve' suggests, that inequality actually increased in the development process. The resulting frustration of demands led typically to class conflict and disorder not containable readily by democratic institutions. This gave rise either to revolution or to military intervention and a conservative authoritarianism protective of the property rights of the dominant classes. Kuznets' finding that when high income levels were reached, inequalities started to decline seemed compatible with MT findings that democratization was associated with and more viable in mature capitalist societies.[21]

In the Middle East, modernization was indeed associated with new inequalities, as new landed classes were established through peasant dispossession and new bourgeoisies enriched from import–export business. The de-stabilization of early democracies resulted from the radicalization of 'new middle classes' that liberal institutions dominated by these oligarchies could not absorb (as long as the majority of voters remained dependent on their landlords) and by the politicization of the military as it became a vehicle of the 'new middle class'.[22] Even in the states with the longest democratic experiences, military intervention in Turkey and civil war in Lebanon could be linked to the inability of semi-democratic institutions to incorporate newly mobilized social forces.

A second obstacle to democratization was the mismatch typical in the LDCs between state and identity from the haphazard imposition of territorial boundaries

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under imperialism. This meant that LDCs did not enjoy the underlying consensus on political community (shared nationhood) that would allow groups to differ peacefully over lesser issues and interests. Rustow argued that the consolidation of national identity was the first requisite stage in democratic transition; without this, electoral competition would only exacerbate communal conflict.[23]

In the Middle East, an inevitable result of the forced fragmentation of the Arab world into a multitude of small weak states was the persistence of sub- and supra-state identities that weakened the identification with the state that was needed for stable democracy. In such conditions, wherein political mobilization tends to exacerbate communal conflict or empowers supra-state movements threatening the integrity of the state, elites are more likely to resort to authoritarian solutions. Moreover, in an Arab world divided into many small weak states, activists, colonels and intellectuals alike tended to give priority not to democracy but to overcoming this disunity. Hence, the main popular political movements, namely pan-Arabism and political Islam, have been preoccupied with identity, unity and authenticity, not democratization, and where they have seized state power, state-building has often taken an authoritarian form, with elites seeking legitimacy, not through democratic consent but through the championing of identity – Arabism, Islam – against imperialism and other enemies. Little momentum for democratization can be built up when the political forces that would otherwise lead the fight for it have been diverted into preoccupation with other concerns.

Another consequence of the way the states system was imposed was that artificial boundaries built irredentism (dissatisfaction with the incongruence of identity communities with a claimed territory) into the very fabric of the states system. This, in turn, meant that the new states were caught in an acute security dilemma in which each perceived the other as a threat. Among the Arab states the threat largely took the form of ideological subversion where, for example, Nasser's Pan-Arab appeal could mobilize the populations of other states against their rulers and, in fact, this was decisive in the destabilization of the early liberal oligarchies and monarchies. On the Arab/non-Arab fault lines of the Middle East, irredentism has been militarized – issuing in the Arab–Israeli and Iran–Iraq wars, all of which were primarily over identity, territory and security. Insecurity and war has naturally fed the rise of national-security states hostile to democratization.

The Middle East remains in 'transition' to modernity; hence the obstacles to democratization typical of the transition persist today. The combination of increased social mobilization (notably literacy) and population growth with increased economic inequality amidst states suffering from unconsolidated political identity makes for a particularly democratic-unfriendly environment.

Social Structure and Alternative Political Paths

The traditional of historical sociology pioneered by Barrington Moore and applied in the Middle East by such writers as Simon Bromley and Haim Gerber, looks to social structure to explain the political paths that states take.[24] Reduced to its simplest terms, social structural analysis argues that democracy requires a balance between the state/ruler and independent classes, in which the state is neither wholly autonomous of

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dominant classes nor captured by them, allowing a space within which civil society can flourish. Democratization requires a 'democratic coalition' that historically has been variously made up of the bourgeoisie (concerned to extract political liberalization and rule of law from the state, but not necessarily democratic inclusion), the middle classes and the working class (needed to widen liberalization into democratization). Where, instead, the landed aristocracy subordinates the bourgeoisie and peasants and dominates the state the outcome is authoritarianism of the right. Where peasants and workers are mobilized in the revolutionary overthrow of the aristocracy, the result is authoritarianism of the left. Subsequent evolution is quite path dependent, that is, states become locked into specific outcomes for long periods. It is worth noting that this argument is not necessarily incompatible with modernization theory: the role of landlords and peasants declines while that of the bourgeoisie, the middle class and workers grows with economic development. However, it should encourage a cautious approach to MT, as thorough transformation of social structure emerges only at relatively high levels of modernization.

In the Middle East social structural conditions do not seem, on the face of it, to favour democratization. Owing to the pre-modern imperial state's relative hostility to private property (notably, in land), and to the region's 'periphery' role in the world capitalist economy as a producer and exporter of primary products, historically the strongest classes were powerful landlords and tribal oil sheikhs. Almost everywhere bourgeoisies were weak, failed to break with landlords, and led no democratic–capitalist revolutions. What remained of the private sector after the 1950–60s wave of nationalizations was either fragmented into a multitude of tiny enterprises or grew up as crony capitalists dependent on the state for contracts, monopolies, and other favours. Such 'crony capitalists' are said widely to have little interest in leading a democratic coalition. Nor has the industrial working class been large or independent enough to provide shock troops for such a coalition. While modernization has stimulated the growth of the educated middle class across the region, this class was initially the product of and dependent on the state. More recently it has struggled to survive as a moonlighting petite bourgeoisie forced into intra-class competition for state patronage, typically through clientelist channels in which ethnic/tribal/sectarian connections are deployed at the expense of the class solidarity that might make for political activism on behalf of democratization. Finally, the special feature of the Middle East's political economy, namely rentierism, shapes a certain regional exceptionalism. In the many cases where large amounts of rent accrue to the state and are distributed as jobs and welfare benefits, ordinary people become highly dependent on the state for their livelihoods and, not being required to pay taxes, are deterred from mobilization to demand representation. At the same time, the dependence of regimes on external sources of rent, whether petroleum revenues or aid, attaches the interests of elites to external markets and states and buffers them from accountability to their populations.[25]

Instead of democracy, two outcomes were typical: in the most tribal regions, oil rentierism locked in a shaikhly authoritarianism of the right. In the more advanced settled regions, large landed classes stimulated radical alliances of the salaried middle class and peasantry, issuing in revolutionary coups and a populist

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authoritarianism of the left. These forms of authoritarianism were arguably congruent with the social structure of their societies, while stable democracy is not likely to be as congruent until and if these structures are transformed.

Regime Institutions and Authoritarian Persistence

The school of 'new institutionalism' argues that the institutional configuration of regimes makes a crucial difference for outcomes,[26] especially in institutionalizing political incorporation of the various social structural configurations discussed above. Against the notion that authoritarian rule is cut from a single cloth (and necessarily 'obsolete' across the board), institutionalism alerts us to the fact that authoritarian regimes are not all alike. Rather, they vary according to their level of institutionalization, which, in turn is shaped by and shapes the social forces that they include and exclude.

In this respect it is necessary, first, to distinguish fairly primitive forms, such as personalistic dictatorships and military juntas which lack institutions able to include supportive social forces and implement policy and are, hence, only likely to be viable at lower levels of development. Quite different are more 'institutionalized' authoritarian regimes, with single party/corporatist systems and bureaucratic/technocratic institutions that are more relatively 'modern', potentially more inclusive and developmentally capable, hence durable at considerably higher levels of development.[27]Secondly, among more developed kinds of regimes, it is necessary to distinguish 'PA' (populist authoritarian) regimes from 'BA' ('bureaucratic authoritarian') regimes.[28] PA regimes originate in the early–middle stages of development in plebeian rebellions against old oligarchies and seek to mobilize and incorporate the masses in the name of redistributive reform (a path that ended up sacrificing economic growth). BA regimes were a phenomenon of the later transition to mass politics in which military officers acting on behalf of the bourgeoisie and foreign capital used authoritarian power to exclude the mobilizing working class in the name of capital accumulation (a path that sacrificed mass welfare).[29] The dominant institutional type that gave birth to most current Middle East regimes was populist authoritarianism (PA).

Steven Heydemann makes the strong claim that PA (with the Syrian case in mind) was successful authoritarianism[30] in that it constituted a formula for constructing quite durable regimes that managed to overcome the 'praetorianism' that seemed to Huntington so rampant in the LDCs during the 1950s and 1960s. Combining institutional with structural analysis allows us to understand both how PA regimes were consolidated and why they have proven so durable and resistant to democratic change.

First, PA regimes issued from revolutionary coups, originating in the heart of society and expressive of revolt by nativist plebeians against cosmopolitan oligarchs entrenched under Western tutelage. PA revolutions incorporated a middle-class/peasant alliance against this oligarchy; they were consolidated amid intense social conflict, with authoritarian rule an instrument of one (plebeian) part of society wielded against the (oligarchic) other part, thus having strong class roots. PA regimes' socio-economic reforms (typically land reform and nationalizations) simultaneously demolished the power of the oligarchy and the bourgeoisie, while a

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populist 'social contract', guaranteeing socio-economic entitlements and rights in return for political acquiescence, gave workers and peasants a certain stake in the persistence of populism. The staying power of PA regimes derived in great part, therefore, from the social forces they selectively incorporated and excluded. The main sources of instability under the earlier landed oligarchic regimes were removed: the large class gaps between landlord and peasant and the incongruence between the social class of the ruling elite and that of the army (middle class and 'ex-peasant'). In consequence, under PA, coups, long the main vehicle of regime change and instability in the region, soon became a thing of the past. In their consolidating phases, at least, when PA regimes needed mass support against their oligarchic enemies, they were by no means so narrowly based as the democratization literature tends to assume. Indeed, in terms of the double criteria of democracy, we could say that while they narrowed competitiveness they increased inclusiveness.

Second, all PA regimes were reactions against ongoing Western penetration of the region and the conflict with Israel. Playing the nationalist card enabled them to discredit the old pro-Western oligarchies while winning over the nationalist middle class and peasantry. It also allowed them to develop nationalist legitimacy in lieu of traditional or democratic legitimacy. In this respect, it is worth noting that Brooker's 1997 study of eight surviving authoritarian regimes found that the only communality among them was nationalist resistance to an external threat.[31] To this very day, descendants of PA regimes, such as Ba'thist Syria, continue to substitute nationalist legitimacy derived from defiance of US and Israeli power in the region for democratization (while the many other regimes that have made their peace with these states suffer from nationalist legitimacy deficits that makes democratization very risky for them).

Third, PA regimes were consolidated structurally. Military and bureaucratic expansion produced the largest organizations in society. Single-party systems penetrated factories, villages and schools and created or took over corporatist associations organizing the various sectors of society – workers, peasants, women, youth. In this respect, it is worth underlining Huntington's argument on order building which is often misunderstood as advocating dictatorship as a solution to praetorianism: he was actually explicit that military dictatorships only replicated praetorianism and that stability required participation demands be satisfied through institution building. But, by contrast to early MT, he argued that single party systems were a viable and modern form of authoritarianism because they could satisfy enough participation demands and organize enough of a constituency for the regime, particularly among the previously non-participant masses, to stabilize states in the transition to modernity.[32] Because armies and bureaucracies can only impose order 'from the outside' and clientelist networks can rarely buy the loyalty of large masses of people, party building was essential if regimes were to 'penetrate' society and incorporate constituencies.

However, the cement of PA regimes turned out to be a more complex mix of tradition and modernity than MT, which defines the two as contrary polarities, can admit to. Indeed, what made PA viable was arguably its successful mix of 'modern' (imported) and 'traditional' (indigenous) forms of 'political cement'.

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First, all PA regimes learned that cohesive elite cores could be built only through the dominance of a personalist leader over the rest of the ruling elite and through the exploitation of indigenous 'political cement' – the trust deriving from likenesses based on kin, tribe, sect, region or graduating class – to link leaders to the 'trusted men' put in command of the structural instruments of power. Second, the distribution of patronage was used to coopt and ensure the loyalty of key groups; and it was the flow of oil revenues and foreign aid that allowed the servicing of clientelist networks inside and outside regime structures. Thus, rational bureaucratic and party structures were interwoven with patrimonial practices.

Fourth, PA regimes enjoyed reliable instruments of repression. They learned how to prevent coups, hitherto the main vehicle of regime change. Multiple wings of the *mukhabarat* (intelligence or security services) maintained pervasive surveillance and specialized security forces repressed active rebellion. It is important to note, however, that successful repression, while crucial for regime survival in times of crisis, must itself be explained, especially given the notorious unreliability of military chains of command in the period of 'praetorianism'. It is only within the context of wider regime construction that the new reliability of the security forces can be understood: the penetration of the army by the party; the purge of higher class elements from the military; the recruitment of the security forces from trusted in-groups; the nationalist legitimacy deriving from the struggle with external enemies – all were among the multiple factors that made repression successful in PA regimes.

Fifth, and crucial to understanding the resistance of PA regimes to democratic change, is that the PA 'revolutions from above' weakened that social force with the strongest interest in the economic liberalization needed to advance political pluralization, namely the bourgeoisie, while incorporating those most threatened by it, namely workers, peasants and civil servants. PA regimes thus tended to deter formation of a democratic coalition because they greatly weakened the bourgeoisie, its potential leading force, and in incorporating the working class and peasants made them unavailable as shock troops of democratic revolution. Additionally, the funnelling of rent through clientelist networks tended to individualize political action as actors sought personal gains through privileged connections to power, thereby fragmenting the potential class action needed for democratization.

In short, Middle Eastern PA regimes were not, as much democratization literature assumes, flimsy. Indicative of their robustness was their survival of repeated challenges, including economic crises, domestic rebellion, wars and intense external pressures. Additionally, surveys of authoritarian regimes by Huntington, Brooker and others found that PA regimes combine all the structural features which, even individually, are most resistant to democratization, namely personalist leadership, single party rule and a politicized army with stake in the regime.[33] The survival of PA regimes appears inexplicable if they are lumped together with primitive versions of authoritarianism in some all-encompassing category such as 'neo-patrimonial'.[34] It is not inexplicable if one appreciates that they are complex regimes, combining multiple governance resources: coercion but going 'beyond coercion' as a definitive study on the durability of the Arab state recognized over a decade ago.[35]

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The other major authoritarian formation in the region, the *rentier monarchy* (RM) has, as Anderson has argued, also proved unexpectedly durable.[36] RM, the outcome of a special combination of oil and tribalism, is also a hybrid of tradition and modernity virtually unique to the Middle East region. While monarchies had a hard time surviving in settled Middle East states with large urbanized middle classes and peasantries, they appear highly congruent with desert tribal societies where traditional forms of patriarchal and religious legitimacy retain credibility and where rent from oil revenues is used to revitalize pre-existing 'traditional' structures around which the state is consolidated. Large extended royal families substitute for the ruling parties of the republics and tribal networks are the equivalent of corporatist associations. The threat from the military that toppled many monarchies has been contained by keeping it small and/or recruited heavily from royal families and tribes rather than the urban middle class. All classes – bourgeoisies, middle classes, working classes – become dependent economically on the rentier state; and because the majority of those residents that do much of the work are not citizens entitled to state benefits, even the least of citizens has a stake in the system.

The populist republics and monarchies emerged originally as rival and hostile political formations, the first embodying a revolt of plebeian groups against the dominant classes and the latter defending the new petro-bourgeoisie against the claims of the Arab world's 'have-nots'. Ironically, at least since the oil boom made some rent available to all, they have converged, with the republics resorting to 'traditional' forms of political cement and, remarkably, even dynastic leadership succession and the monarchies deploying populist sorts of 'social contracts' with their populations. This seems evidence that the state consolidation formulas each has, through trial and error, reached over time are indeed congruent with their environments. What makes the Middle East 'exceptional' is less culture, per se, than the unique institutional–social structural configurations by which it has combined mass incorporating populism with rent-lubricated patrimonialism – a combination nearly unique to this region.[37]

Post-Populist Political Economy and Lopsided Political Liberalization

Even if we accept the argument of 'path dependency' that elites will resist any departure from such proven state-building formulae as PA and RM, both regime types are nevertheless subject to pressures for change as, in important ways, their congruence with their environments has been undermined by economic troubles and global pressures to which they must inevitably seek to adjust.

PA obviously had large liabilities: it was rooted in no large-property owning class having a stake in its survival and prepared to invest in the growth of its economic base, while the subordination of the public sector to the political needs of the regime tended to sacrifice economic rationality. The particular strategy of development it adopted, state-led import substituting industrialization, is inherently a merely transitional model which soon exhausts itself in trade and foreign-exchange deficits. Eventually it must give way to capital deepening and export strategies to sustain development: that is, it must come to terms with the world capitalist

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market. The economic growth that it manages to promote cannot keep up with the population explosions that populist welfare programmes actually encourage. PA is, hence, very economically vulnerable. These vulnerabilities, issuing in economic crises, often deepened by war-induced military spending, forced all Middle Eastern PA regimes into a phase of post-populist authoritarianism (PPA) involving economic liberalization (*infitah*).[38] Economic liberalization was seen as the key to regime survival as it was expected that it would make the private sector a new engine of growth to supplement the stagnating public sector and generate a new bourgeois class with a stake in the regime. But regimes were buffered from pressures to liberalize and PPA was delayed or diluted to the extent they were able to draw on rent (oil or international aid).

Because mature capitalism and democracy go together, it might be expected that economic liberalization would prepare the ground for democratization. Whether it will or not in the long term, a number of authors, including Brumberg, Owen, Sayigh, Farsoun and Zacharia, Perthes and Ehteshami and Murphy have shown why this is not necessarily so in the short term.[39]

First, the shift to PPA regimes is associated with an increasing tendency on the part of the ruling elite to use their control over the economy (originating in statist development) for private enrichment. Hence, democratization would put the very sources of wealth of the ruling elite at risk (by contrast, in right-wing authoritarianism in which control of property, being outside the political sphere, is less at issue, pacts enabling transitions to democracy are easier).[40] So, a period of transition in which the state privatizes public sector assets and a part of these are acquired by political elites, perhaps in partnership with private and foreign investors, must take place if elites are to countenance a diffusion of political power; in short, a period of 'crony capitalism' intervenes between statism and a market economy. Crony capitalism, depending on privileged non-transparent clientelist connections between investors and state elites that could be exposed under democracy, is likely to delay democratic transitions.

Second, the success of economic liberalization has unavoidable policy requisites that deter democratization. To restore confidence to investors in regimes that attacked the bourgeoisie a generation ago is not easy and requires, among other things, policies which strongly favour them, including subsidies, low taxes, de-regulation and a roll-back of the social protections such as labour rights and agrarian relations laws legislated by PA regimes. Nor is significant private investment likely to be forthcoming without a foreign policy alignment with the West (but which, coming at a time when the United States is associated increasingly widely with pro-Israeli and anti-Arab and anti-Islamic policies, is likely to cost legitimacy). This scenario also requires 'economic structural adjustment' to enable foreign debts to be paid off, which typically puts the burden on 'have-nots' (such as by cutting food subsidies and state employment), thus dismantling the tacit populist social contract on which PA regimes were initially erected and legitimized. While this has sometimes been accompanied by some measure of political opening, it has *not* been compensated for by conceding real mechanisms of accountability and participation rights as a new basis of regime legitimacy. Ruling

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elites cannot readily democratize and empower the masses at a time when they are reneging on the populist social contract and sacrificing their nationalist legitimacy.[41]

This is where the Islamic factor has its main impact in deterring democratization. Islamic movements fill the welfare gap left by the state's post-populist retreat from its welfare responsibilities and, as they champion the victims of economic liberalization, the banner of populism is transferred from regime to Islamic opposition. This dynamic tends to make the political incorporation of Islamic movements incompatible with post-PA economic liberalization. However, without inclusion of Islamist movements in the political system, there can be political liberalization but there can be no democratization. There is, of course, another strand in political Islam that is pro-capitalist and, were it to win ascendancy, it could conceivably bring a large segment of the masses into a democratic–capitalist coalition. Perhaps this is happening in Turkey, with the rise to governing power of the Islamist Justice and Development Party but, generally, Islamic movements that embrace neo-liberalism risk splintering and the emergence of more radical factions contesting their hold over their constituencies.

Finally, the short-term outcomes of economic liberalization discourage democratization. The authoritarian state is strengthened by access to new revenue sources and the incorporation of previously hostile privileged social forces into its coalition; incorporation of the latter also strengthens the ability of rulers to marginalize (elite statist or mass populist) opposition. The cooptation of the bourgeoisie and its dependence on the state for business opportunities (contracts, licenses) and for disciplining the working class and rolling back populism means it is not available to lead a democratic coalition. Because the new bourgeoisie cannot be readily taxed, and in practice exports much of its profits rather than investing them at home, the government cannot, even if it so wished, fully privatize the economy and divest the state of the social–economic power that supports authoritarianism. Moreover, the continued access enjoyed by most PPA regimes to some rent dilutes the incentive to engage in full-scale privatization and sustains their ability to maintain the dependence of the bourgeoisie on the state. Economic liberalization has not resulted in the growth of a competitive capitalist class independent of, and needed by, the state as an engine of growth, employment or taxation that would hence be able and willing to lead a democratic coalition. Rather, it has produced a (possibly transitional) stage of rent-seeking, state-dependent capitalism which, as distinguished from mature capitalism, is compatible with limited political pluralization, but not with democratization. Indeed, if PA is the political formation associated with statist development, PPA corresponds to the phase of crony capitalism.

The requisites of this phase tend to dictate specific political innovations, what might be called limited and lopsided political liberalization designed to give confidence to and open access to policy-makers for investors, especially crony capitalists, but to stop well short of the democratization that could institutionalize political accountability and empower the have-nots to challenge and possibly overturn post-populist economic strategies.

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Under this post-populist form of authoritarian governance, the top ruler still enjoys indefinite tenure exempted from competitive election and retains his vast powers of appointment/dismissal and patronage (allowing him to coopt and rotate elites and sustain clientele networks). Nevertheless, several structural adaptations take place which manifest the lopsided or class-biased character of political liberalization. These are as follows.

First, selected access to the ruling elite is opened for businessmen through parliaments and corporatist associations (for example, chambers of commerce) resulting in increased influence of and concessions to their interests in policy-making and facilitating the clientelist connections that fuel crony capitalism.

Second, the judiciary is empowered to enforce *selective* rule of law, most importantly for protecting property rights, but very little to protect political dissent.

Third, greater freedom of the press and expression is allowed to appease the middle class but is combined with selective- or self-censorship enforcing 'red lines' beyond which criticism (notably of the ruler) may not tread.

Fourth, more scope for civil society and some party pluralism is allowed in order to appease the middle class. But this is combined with strict controls to prevent either non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or opposition political parties from gaining access to and organizing the mass public in a way that might allow them to mobilize real power. This limited pluralization actually benefits the regime in that the pluralization of parties, by institutionalizing the multiple cleavages that split society, facilitates a divide and rule strategy, while controls on party activity ensures the ruling party remains dominant.

Fifth, at the same time, the political demobilization and marginalization of former populist constituencies is pursued, albeit selectively and in increments to prevent popular revolt.

Hence, the paradoxical lesson of the PPA experience is that in most cases movement away from 'hard' authoritarianism actually translates not into more popular power, but into privileged class power and less popular inclusion. It signifies a simultaneous expansion of competitiveness and shrinkage of inclusion. Moreover, according to Brumberg, 'the trademark mixture of guided pluralism, controlled elections, and selective repression... [typical of PPA which he calls 'liberalized autocracy'] is not just a "survival strategy" adopted by authoritarian regimes, but rather a type of political system whose institutions, rules, and logic defy any linear model of democracy'.[42] What underlies this is one simple reality: political liberalization is needed for economic liberalization but it cannot turn into democratization without the mobilization of subaltern strata that PPA is actually designed to obstruct. Thus, PPA is both a substitute for and obstacle to democratization.[43]

It is worth noting that rentier monarchies may be better positioned to manage post-populist development because, having no history of hostility to the dominant classes, they are better able to ensure investor confidence; because in their conservative forms of Islam they enjoy some ideological legitimation of the new inequalities fostered under crony capitalism that the secular republics lack; and because they preside over less class-mobilized tribal societies more effectively encapsulated in rent-funded clientelism.

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Elite Calculations and the Risks of Democratic Transition

The discussion up to now has stressed structural conditions but agency, in other words what elites do, is crucial to political outcomes. Many democratic transitions have been elite-initiated but it seems reasonable to expect that political elites, as rational actors, will only democratize if they think their vital interests will survive or even be enhanced by the transition from authoritarianism or that the costs and risks of democratization would be lower than those of continued repression. As Waterbury and Salame insist, elites need not be committed democrats to initiate democratization if the alternative is a less desirable crisis or stalemate situation that cannot otherwise be overcome.[44]

In this respect, transition theory holds that the optimal scenario for elite-led democratization is a combination of (a) elite divisions inside an authoritarian regime and (b) the formation of an alliance between regime liberals and an opposition that is both moderate yet popularly credible, in order to marginalize the hard-liners in both camps and incorporate the masses in a way compatible with regime reform rather than collapse. This alliance would reach a pact, embodying a compromise preserving elite interests while accommodating and promising the opposition increased influence through a gradual democratization.[45]

Succession of a new regime leader might cause the split in the regime and present an opportunity for reaching a pact as intra-elite competition leads members of the elite to reach out for public support. The generational change in leadership that has started in the Middle East might be expected to facilitate democratization, especially as new young leaders were socialized in a period in which authoritarian rule has become discredited. It has not yet done so, however, for democratization is much more risky in the Middle East than it is in most other areas.

Mansfield and Snyder show that one way elites have sustained their power in the transition to democracy is to play the nationalist card,[46] and in the Middle East there is an enormous reservoir of nationalist grievances that elites could tap. Yet, the external dependency of most Middle East elites makes this card too dangerous to play as it would probably foster irredentist conflict or put the state at odds with Western patrons; this leaves the nationalist card to counter-elites, making it an obstacle to democratization. A relevant case in point is the history of Jordan's attempted democratization. The initial early-1990s success of Jordan's pact depended on the special nationalist legitimacy won by King Hussein as a result of his disengagement from the West Bank to the benefit of the Palestine Liberation Organization and by his stand against the West in the first Iraq war of 1991. However, Jordan's subsequent foreign policy re-alignment toward the United States and its peace treaty with Israel cost the monarchy a good deal of this legitimacy bonus and, as the opposition mobilized the public against relations with Israel, required that it put the brakes on, even reverse, its democratization experiment. The US aid the regime received in return preserved the rent-funded clientele networks that buttressed monarchic authoritarianism.[47]

Elites look to precedents to gauge whether the probable outcome of democratization will serve their interests. Unfortunately, there are many cautionary tales of which

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regional elites are acutely conscious. Algeria produced the harshest lesson, namely that economic reform combined with rapid and thorough democratization is disastrous: there it produced Islamist electoral victory, military intervention, civil war (in which the hard-liners on both sides marginalized the moderates) and the rapid reversal of democratization. Elites are mindful, too, of another negative example, the Soviet scenario, where simultaneous economic liberalization and democratization led to regime collapse. Boix has shown that democratic pacts are easier to reach under relative social equality or rapid economic growth when the rich need not fear the majority will use democracy to impose redistributive measures. However, most Middle East states are currently in a transition to capitalism wherein inequality is increasing but growth has not yet given the masses the stake in the status quo that would make democratization low-risk for the 'haves'.[48]

Democratization must be seen by key actors as the best way to avoid disorder. But where national legitimacy is declining and economic pain increasing, and where rapid or thorough processes of democratization might bring about regime collapse or civil violence, democratization does not necessarily appear as an exit from crisis.[49] What is striking is that even the middle classes, especially the intelligentsia, elsewhere in the vanguard of democratization and human rights movements, remain ambivalent in the Middle East, wanting democratization but also fearing it could open the door to civil strife and Islamist victory. It is hardly surprising, then, that among elites themselves hard-liners have often won the argument within regimes. Elites tend to see sustained economic growth capable of providing jobs and income for widening sectors of ordinary people (the classic 'trickle-down' scenario) as the only way of making democratization and capitalism compatible, and hence they embrace the idea of the East Asian model – 'economic growth first, democracy later'.

Some analysts argue, however, that economic growth requires democratization which alone can ensure the reforms, notably rule of law and the rooting of legitimacy in consent and procedural legality rather than the economically irrational patronage practices that sustain authoritarian regimes. While acknowledging this, Eva Bellin has cautioned rightly that the link between democratization and economic reform is tenuous, that authoritarian regimes may be able to reform, and that there is not even a guarantee that reform will produce the requisite growth to facilitate stable democracy.[50] But if incumbent regimes cannot produce economic growth, the actual outcome may be regime collapse.

Roads to Democratization?

While the obstacles to democracy are formidable, Turkey, the one successful democratic transition in the Middle East, suggests what conditions might facilitate it. The relatively high nationalist legitimacy with which state-founder Ataturk had endowed the state and Turkey's relative congruence between identity and territory provided the country with the national identity and coherence that made democratization less risky than would be so in most Arab states. After the Second World War, the ruling authoritarian elite split into two equal factions and agreed to settle their rivalries by electoral competition. The competing Republican People's Party and Democrat Party, coming out of the same establishment, shared basic interests and values. Democratizing at a

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fairly early stage of social mobilization enabled the two competing parties, between them, to mobilize the public into two moderate centre-right and centre-left camps. Enjoying relatively little rent, the state was dependent on civil society for revenues, while a private bourgeoisie had been fostered, via the privatization of state firms. A relatively equitable distribution of land meant that a conservative (rather than a revolutionary) peasantry could be safely given the vote, while secular reforms and education had produced a secular middle class supportive of democracy and a relatively liberal Islamic movement that sought admission to the democratic game. Aligning with the West facilitated capitalist development without sacrificing legitimacy, because Russia was seen as the main national threat. Even with all these advantages Turkey was still not spared periodic democratic breakdown, but military interventions (coups) have always been brief and aimed at restoring an elitist version of democracy.[51]

Lebanon is the Arab country that has been most democratic for the longest period and its consociational model might be thought appropriate for its neighbours; but Lebanon has a unique combination of features. They include the mountains which deterred emergence of a large landed class; sectarian fragmentation and a lack of oil, which obstructed a strong state centre and army; the combination of this with Lebanon's position as a trading entrepôt between the West and the Gulf, which allowed a bourgeoisie, in alliance with the traditional notability (*zuama*), to dominate and reach a cross-sectarian power-sharing pact. Yet Lebanon, nevertheless, failed to make the transition from liberal oligarchy to democracy: its pact collapsed in sectarian civil war amidst anti-system mass mobilization linked with still unresolved regional conflicts played out on its territory. The subsequent limited pluralist regime reconstructed under Syria's tutelage may not survive the latter's departure.

These two cases do, however, suggest that if other regional states acquire some of their democracy-enabling features then chances of democratic transition might improve.

Globalization and International Forces

Globalization theory posits significant consequences for forms of governance worldwide but there is no consensus on the direction in which this is going. In the view of globalization enthusiasts the outward spread to the periphery (LDCs) of economic liberalization stimulates transnational bourgeoisies more independent of the state, forces more rule of law and political pluralization, and, reinforced by the global triumph of liberal ideology, issues in democratization.[52] In the Middle East, there is limited evidence of all of these developments except the last.

A second approach posits a dichotomy between zones of peace in the core, where democratization holds, and zones of war in the periphery where it does not.[53] While the democratic peace and economic interdependence in the core spells an appropriate liberal 'virtuous circle' for taming the power struggle between states, their absence in the periphery sets up a 'vicious circle' where war precludes the economic interdependence and democratization that in principle could, in turn, deter war. There can be little doubt that the Middle East remains a zone of war, with all the deleterious consequences for democratization: over-sized armies, the dissent-intolerant atmosphere

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of national-security states, and the deterrence of investment that could generate prosperity giving people a stake in peace. On the other hand, one could see regional peace processes and the Euro-Med Partnership as efforts to bridge the core–periphery gap, stimulate economic and political liberalization and encourage internationalist-minded elites that might ultimately lead democratic coalitions.[54]

Critical globalization theorists see quite another outcome. In their view, globalization is causing the transfer of power away from states and the empowerment of transnational corporations and international regimes (such as the International Monetary Fund, World Trade Organization and even the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership) that seek to impose neo-liberal prescriptions on the Middle East. This, they argue, is turning states from buffers against global economic insecurity and class inequality into transmission belts of both.[55] In the weaker states of the LDCs, where this is most manifestly the case, globalization deters or dilutes the democratization that would make governments responsive to domestic rather than international demands, but even in the developed Western core it drives a hollowing out of democracy. A symptom of this is the removal of the large economic issues from political debate as the neo-liberal status quo is frozen by international conventions.[56] As a result, party choice largely disappears (all party programmes become similarly neo-liberal, even though the Kuznets curve of inequality has again been rising in all the Western democracies) and, as a result, participation (electoral turnout) is everywhere in decline. The growing role of big money and big media in shaping electoral outcomes biases them in favour of the 'haves'. As citizens are de-mobilized, international networks of political elites listen to each other increasingly and ignore their citizens. (A striking example of which is the way the British, Spanish and Italian governments ignored public opinion in backing the US invasion of Iraq; of course the counter example, Germany, where an election turning on this very issue resulted in the opposite policy, shows that democracy, if under threat, is still far from dead.)

Could it be that, as the core becomes less democratic while the periphery becomes more politically pluralized, what we are seeing is a convergence toward varying degrees of semi-democracy as all states become more alike in having the forms of democracy but with limited democratic content?[57] This outcome is compatible with older traditions of thinking that were always sceptical of democratic ideology: Marx's view that great economic inequality combined with liberal political forms amounted to class rule is by no means obsolete. Similarly, Mosca and Michels both showed that the iron law of oligarchy was perfectly compatible with liberal constitutional forms.[58]

This is the context in which one has to put the impact of the new American hegemony on democratization prospects. The fall of the Soviet bloc removed not only an authoritarian model that had once seemed successful and worth emulating in the Middle East, but also the Soviet patron-protector that had allowed the authoritarian republics to stabilize themselves against Western hostility. The current international power imbalance is thus profoundly hostile to nationalist/populist versions of authoritarianism. But that does not make the unipolar international order friendly to democratization in the Middle East. For decades, as Anderson put it, 'access to oil and the

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security of Israel have trumped the desire for human rights and democracy' in US policy toward the region. The US government rhetorically demands democratization but, as many shrewd observers note, simultaneously generates conditions that make it less likely.[59] To appease the demands made by the United states in waging its 'war on terror', local regimes are set at odds with the Islamists that comprise a large part of their attentive publics. The resolution of the Arab–Israeli conflict is the single most important prerequisite for extricating the region from the zone of war, but the deeply biased foreign policy of the United States makes that unlikely. Whatever the long-term effects of regime change in Iraq, the helplessness of the Arab states in the face of US aggression against Iraq afflicted almost every Arab regime with legitimacy losses, and gave new credibility to Islamic radicals while putting pro-Western democracy advocates on the defensive. It hardened the determination of elites to prevent a similar descent into anarchy in their own countries. Nor can the disorder unleashed by the US invasion of Iraq be encouraging to disorder-averse publics in neighbouring states who might otherwise welcome democratization. While regimes may be under some pressure to appease the United States with token democratization, the foregoing conditions provide a very risky environment for allowing such experiments to proceed very far. Indeed, what the US administration really seems to want is rule by a transnational bourgeoisie (or liberal oligarchy) responsive to its demands and resistant to indigenous ones. While this is compatible with controlled political pluralization, US interests are not really compatible with democratization. This is because democratization risks empowering mass forces deeply hostile to the United States. As such, unless Middle East states incur US displeasure for quite other reasons (a fate Syria and Iran risk), most authoritarian regimes should be able to adapt to the demands of the hegemon by simply deepening their current pluralization for the 'haves'.

Conclusion

Authoritarianism is the modal form of governance in the Middle East for several reasons. Extremely hostile structural conditions that include limited modernization, an unsolved national problem, and particular class configurations aborted early limited democracies. Their authoritarian successors found the resources to build robust modernized forms of authoritarianism congruent with this environment. These regimes constructed institutions incorporating sufficient social forces to enable them to manage their societies, thus raising the threshold of modernization beyond which authoritarian governance becomes unviable. While, subsequently, internal economic vulnerabilities and global pressures on these regimes became substantial, the post-populist solutions adopted, economic liberalization and westward-looking foreign policy alignment, all allowed an adaptive pluralization of authoritarianism (PPA) while obstructing democratization.

Two paths to democratization are possible. If reformist authoritarian regimes can deliver increased rule of law, better regulatory frameworks, educational reforms and merit-based recruitment to the bureaucracy, they could precipitate the investment and economic growth needed to expand the middle class, civil society and an independent

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bourgeoisie, while increasing regime legitimacy and dampening Islamist radicalism. This would create conditions similar to those that precipitated democratic transition in East Asia. However, this scenario of enhanced regime legitimacy and growing investment confidence is implausible without a resolution of the national problem. That resolution depends on policies outside the control of the Middle East, namely a change in the intrusive and biased Middle East policies of the US hegemon. Democracy would still only come about after a long-term evolution. A second pathway, 'from below', is also possible. Assuming that the liabilities of incumbent regimes remain unresolved, regime collapse might provide the conditions for a negotiated democratization pact cutting across the state–society divide. However, as the Iraq case suggests, if this scenario is delivered as a by-product of US intervention or pressure the outcome may well be anarchy, not democracy.

NOTES

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12. Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, *Comparative Politics: a Developmental Approach* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), pp. 255–332; Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society* (New York: Free Press, 1958); Charles Issawi, 'Economic and Social Foundations of Democracy in the Middle East', *International Affairs*, Vol. 32, No. 1(1956), pp. 27–42.
13. On the threshold, see John Waterbury, 'Democracy without Democrats?: the Potential for Political Liberalization in the Middle East', in Salame (note 5), pp. 23–24.
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37. For a more detailed argument on state formation in the Middle East see Raymond Hinnebusch, *International Politics of the Middle East* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), pp. 80–5; see also the same author's *Syria: Revolution from Above* (London & New York: Routledge, 2001), especially pp. 1–13.
38. The first use of 'post-populist' was in the writer's *Egyptian Politics under Sadat: the Post-populist Development of an Authoritarian-Modernizing State* (Cambridge University Press, 1985).
39. Daniel Brumberg, 'Authoritarian Legacies and Reform Strategies in the Arab World', in Brynen, Korany and Noble (note 5), pp. 229–60; Samih Farsoun and Christina Zacharia, 'Class, Economic Change and Political Liberalization in the Arab world,' in Brynen, Korany and Noble (note 5), pp. 261–82; Roger Owen, 'Socio-economic Change and Political Mobilization: the Case of Egypt', in Salame (note 5), pp. 183–99; Yezid Sayigh, 'Globalization Manque: regional fragmentation and authoritarian liberalism in the Middle East', in Louise Fawcett and Yezid Sayigh, *The Third World Beyond the Cold War: Continuity & Change*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 200–33; Volker Perthes, 'The Private Sector, Economic Liberalization, and the Prospects of Democratization: the Case of Syria and some other Arab countries,' in Salame (note 5), pp. 243–69; Ehteshami & Murphy (note 6).
40. Roland Dannreuther, 'The Political Dimension: Authoritarianism and Democratization', in Fawcett and Sayigh (note 39), pp. 34–55.
41. Eberhard Kienle, in *Egypt: A Grand Delusion* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2001), p. 187 argues strongly in the Egyptian case that structural adjustment actually *requires* restrictions on liberty. That PPA regimes have suffered a legitimacy loss after their PA period is forcefully argued by Burhan Ghalioun, 'The Persistence of Arab Authoritarianism', *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 15, No. 4 (2004), pp. 126–32. He argues that today's PPA regimes 'have nothing in common with the populist or nationalist regimes that inaugurated the post-independence era. Despite their authoritarian character, those populist regimes ... by eliminating the remnants of feudalism and aristocratic parasitism, by distributing land to peasants, by founding national state structures ... and by pushing economic modernization... succeeded in gaining the trust and support of large sectors of the population [such that] their authoritarianism was almost hidden by their popularity.' By contrast, PPA regimes 'enjoy no popular support. They serve only the interest of the clans who hold power, ... and they depend for their survival solely upon coercion ... '. Ibid., pp. 126–7.
42. Daniel Brumberg, 'The Trap of Liberalized Autocracy', *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 13, No. 4 (2002), pp. 56–68.
43. R. Hinnebusch (note 9).
44. See, in particular, John Waterbury, 'Democracy Without Democrats?', in Salame (note 5), especially pp. 32–41.
45. For the transition literature and pacts, see G. O'Donnell, P. Schmitter and L. Whitehead, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 4 vols, 1986); for Middle East applications, see Waterbury in Salame (note 5), pp. 33–41 and Jean Leca, 'Democratization in the Arab World: Uncertainty, Vulnerability and Legitimacy', in Salame (note 5), pp. 49–53.
46. Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Synder, 'Democratization and the Danger of War', *International Security*, Vol. 20, No. 1 (1995), pp. 5–38.
47. Jillian Schwedler, 'Don't Blink: Jordan's Democratic Opening and Closing', MERIP Press Information Note 98, 3 July 2002.
48. Carles Boix, *Democracy and Redistribution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
49. Transitions in Eastern Europe did come about in the face of rising inequality and economic pain, but regimes there were recovering nationalist legitimacy (as they were freed of Soviet control).
50. Eva Bellin, 'The Political Economic Conundrum: The Affinity of Economic and Political Reform in the Middle East and North Africa', Carnegie Paper Number 53, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Democracy and Rule of Law Project (November 2004).
51. Joseph S. Szyliowicz, 'Elites and Modernization in Turkey', in Frank Tachau, *Political Elites and Political Development in the Middle East* (Cambridge, MA: Schenkman Publishing, 1975), pp. 23–65.
52. Francis Fukuyama, 'The End of History?', *The National Interest*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (1989), pp. 2–18, is the prototype statement of globalization enthusiasts who see no alternative to democratization. For a more measured argument, see Lucian Pye, 'Political Science and the Crisis of Authoritarianism', *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 84, No. 1 (1990), pp. 3–19 and Etel Solingen, *Regional*

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Orders at Century's Dawn: Global and Domestic influence on Grand Strategy (Princeton, NJ: University Press, 1998).

53. James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, 'A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in the Post-Cold War Era', *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 1, (1992), pp. 467–92; Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky, *The Real World Order* (NJ: Chatham House, 1993).
54. In Eastern Europe the transition was facilitated by the prospect of European Union accession which convinced elites and masses alike that it would be worth the cost. The Euro-Med partnership, providing far less in benefits and carrying considerable risks for regional states, can therefore have only a much more tepid impact.
55. Robert Cox with Timothy J. Sinclair, *Approaches to World Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 154.
56. Robert W. Cox, 'Economic Globalization and the Limits of Liberal Democracy', in Anthony McGrew (ed.), *The Transformation of Democracy: Globalization and Territorial Democracy* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997), pp. 49–72; Stephen Gill, 'Globalization, Market Civilization and Disciplinary Neo-liberalism', *Millennium* Vol. 24, No. 3 (1995), pp. 399–423.
57. I am indebted to Sami Zemni for this idea.
58. Karl Marx argued in 1867 in his *Capital: a Critique of Political Economy* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1981) that the specific form in which a surplus is extracted from producers determines the relationship of rulers and ruled, the corresponding form of state. Thus, extraction is political and direct under feudalism and indirect and via the labour market under democratic capitalism; but both are forms of *class rule*. Gaetano Mosca, *The Ruling Class* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1935) and Roberto Michels, *Political Parties: a Sociological Study of the Oligarchic Tendencies of Modern Democracy* (NY: Free Press, 1962), document the oligarchic realities behind democratic appearances.
59. Muqtedar Khan, 'Prospects for Muslim Democracy: The Role of U.S. Policy', *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 10, No. 3 (2003), pp. 1–19; Alan Richards, 'Democracy in the Arab Region: Getting There from Here', *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 12, No. 2 (2005), available at: http://www.mepc.org/public_asp/journal_vol12/0506_richards.asp.

Manuscript accepted for publication January 2006.

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